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Enduring Families, Enduring the Adoption Process 

The Adoption and Children Act 2002 allowed unmarried couples in England and Wales, whatever the genders of the parties, jointly to adopt children for the first time.  One of the questions at issue in T & M v OCC & C [2010] EWHC 964 (Fam) was whether the applicants for an adoption order satisfied the definition of “couple” eligible to adopt jointly contained in section 144 of the 2002 Act.  Unsurprisingly, a relevant couple can be two people who are married to, or in a same-sex civil partnership with, each other.  A much broader definition, contained section 144(4)(b), involves “two people (whether of different sexes or the same sex) living as partners in an enduring family relationship”. 
	T and M are women who were born in the United States and Nicaragua respectively.  In 1991, they entered a relationship that had “endured unbroken” at the point when the case was decided (at [3]), although they do not appear to have formalised it in a civil partnership (or any overseas equivalent) at any stage.  While in living in Nicaragua, they “adopted” two young girls, J and C. There was, however, one significant complication.  Because Nicaragua did not allow same-sex adoption, it was decided that T would adopt J and that M would adopt C, the child of one of M’s relatives.  Indeed, before non-marital joint adoption was introduced by the 2002 Act, a similarly pragmatic solution involving an adoption order granted in favour of one party and a residence order granted in favour of both was in evidence in England and Wales (see, e.g., Re AB (A Minor) (Adoption: Parental Consent) [1996] 1 F.L.R. 27).
	The couple and the two children lived together as a family in Nicaragua and subsequently moved to England.  Unfortunately, J’s experience of abandonment by her natural family and being brought up in an orphanage for much of her life caused an “attachment disorder” (at [7]).  This manifested itself in a very difficult relationship between J and M (who was not her adoptive mother), such that T and M decided to live in separate (but close) homes for a time.  While J remained with T, the couple shared care of C.  T and M, desiring equal status with regard to C, sought to adopt her jointly.  At the time of the hearing, they were still living separately, although the women saw each other almost daily and the family of four often spent time together at weekends and on holiday.
	The first question to be decided was whether M should be considered the sole legal parent of C, such that only her consent was needed for the new adoption.  Hedley J. decided that the Nicaraguan adoption should be recognised at common law in England and Wales, on the bases that it was obtained lawfully in Nicaragua, that the Nicaraguan concept of adoption is “broadly in accord” with that prevailing in England and Wales (at [14]) and that no public policy considerations mitigated against recognition.  M was therefore the sole legal parent of C, who had lived with her since 1999.  Although the 2002 Act allows the partner of a parent to adopt without affecting that parent’s status so that she does not have to adopt her own child (s.46(3)(b), s.51(2)), T and M framed their application jointly such that M was effectively seeking to adopt C for the second time.
	As a result of this choice, it had to be established that the applicants were a “couple” for adoption purposes despite the unusual living situation that they had set up for the sake of the family’s stability.  Hedley J. opined that the words “living as partners in an enduring family relationship”, contained in section 144(4)(b) of the 2002 Act, were “no doubt” chosen so as not to require residence in the same property (at [16]).  This conclusion is entirely consistent with judicial interpretation in other areas of the law.  For example, although the qualifying criteria for a cohabitant making a claim against his or her now-deceased partner’s estate are that he or she lived “in the same household as the deceased” as either a spouse or a civil partner for a two-year period ending with the death (Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, s.1(1)(ba), s.1(1A)-1(1B)), it was nevertheless confirmed in Churchill v Roach ([2002] EWHC 3230 (Ch)) that even these stricter criteria do not require the parties to have shared a common property.
	What is required under the 2002 Act, according to Hedley J., is an “an unambiguous intention to create and maintain family life”, coupled with a “factual matrix” consistent with such an intention (at [16]).  Perhaps unhelpfully, if inevitably, the judged branded the second requirement a matter of fact and degree in each individual case.  In the case before him, Hedley J. noted that “the parties live in a committed and exclusive relationship recognised by [English] family law”, and that T, M and the children “spend significant time as a unit of four” (at [17]).  He therefore concluded that T and M satisfied section 144(4)(b) and qualified as a “couple” .
	The 2002 Act also imposes a minimum length of time during which the relevant child must have lived with the prospective adopters.  Different conditions are applied by potentially overlapping sub-sections.  If “the applicant or one of the applicants is the partner of a parent of the child”, the relevant condition is that “the child must have had his home with the…applicants at all times during the period of six months preceding the application” (s.42(3)).  Under section 42(2), on the other hand, where the child was placed by an adoption agency “with the applicant or applicants” or “the applicant is the parent of the child”, the child can have had his home with only one applicant for a shorter period of ten weeks.  Quite understandably, the judge had difficulty in determining which of these provisions should be invoked in the case at hand, since M was the legal parent of C and T was the partner of M.  In fact, it seems as though section 42(3) was intended to cover cases such as T & M v OCC & C, since (because of the use of singular and plural) the reference to “applicant or applicants” in section 42(2) in all likelihood relates to placement by an adoption agency rather than cases where one of two applicants was the child’s legal parent. 
	In any case, even if C was required to have lived with both T and M for a given period, Hedley J. was satisfied that the condition, which he also regarded as a question of fact, was met.  This decision fits with the judge’s conclusion on section 144(4)(b).  If T and M lived in an “enduring family relationship”, C had certainly lived within that relationship for the relevant period.
Finally, Hedley J. had to be satisfied that the making of the adoption order would be consistent with C’s best interests.  He was so satisfied, since inter alia C wanted to be J’s sister and for M and T to have equal status in relation to her, C had contact with relatives who were supportive of the adoption, and she would be a beneficiary under T’s family trusts.  This appears to be the correct conclusion, not least because the fact that T and M were content to reside in separate properties itself demonstrates their commitment to prioritising C’s welfare.
The test proposed by Hedley J. on the definition of “couple” is to be welcomed for its inclusion of those prospective adopters who must on occasion live apart for multifarious reasons.  Indeed, the judge explicitly recognised that parents often have to live separately for work-related purposes, and do so “without in any [ ] way imperilling an enduring family relationship” (at [16]).  At the same time, his test sensibly excludes those who have no intention of maintaining a family life.  It is generally logically inconsistent with a joint application for adoption that the applicants do not share any sort of family life as between themselves, with the consequence that the adoptive parents’ role in a child’s life would be far short of equal.  There would be an element of futility if a court were to grant an adoption order to both parties in such circumstances, and it should not be forgotten that adoption orders can be made in favour of single applicants.
That said, T & M v OCC & C was not a difficult case to which to apply the test.  The domestic arrangements constructed by T and M had an air of necessity, and the judge repeatedly emphasised that a “unit of four” existed in the past and sometimes in the present.  It is possible to imagine much more difficult cases, such as those involving other unmarried couples who “live apart together”, conducting a monogamous sexual relationship but perhaps without intending or even desiring ever to share a common household (see, e.g., Laskey and Lewis, (2006) 2 Journal of Law in Context 37).  On the other hand, a choice not to cohabit is not necessarily fatal to the establishment of “family life” for the purposes of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights where children are involved (see, e.g. Kroon v The Netherlands [1995] 2 F.C.R. 28).
 	These issues highlight the distinctive approach to joint parenthood pursued in the context of adoption.  It is interesting that, outside the realm of assisted reproduction, even the virtual non-existence or the irretrievable breakdown of a relationship between natural parents cannot of itself prevent the formation or continuance of a legal tie between the relevant child and both parents.  Indeed, contact with both legal parents is usually considered to be in the best interest of a child, whatever the status of the relationship with between those parents (see, e.g., Re L (A Child) (Contact: Domestic Violence) [2001] Fam. 260).  But the process of adoption is inherently selective.  The welfare of the child is the paramount consideration in adoption decisions (2002 Act, s 1(2)) and adoption agencies follow “rigorous vetting procedures” when choosing prospective adoptive parents (Harris-Short and Miles, Family Law: Text, Cases and Materials (2007), 1005).  Inevitably, such procedures are not applied to those who procreate without assistance.  With adoption, on the other hand, the state is presented with an opportunity to place a filter on those who would be legal parents, and it would clearly be inconsistent with the aim of promoting child welfare if that opportunity were not taken to a significant extent.  
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